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MUNICIPAL FINANCE: CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS
AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE VALIDITY OF
MUNICIPAL BOND ISSUES
In recent years, state legislatures have passed new conflict of interests
legislation intended to prevent public officials' personal interests in munic-
ipal business transactions.' At common law and under statutory authority,
municipal contracts tainted by prohibited interests are either void in their
inception or voidable at the discretion of the municipality.' As a result,
bond counsel responsible for assuring that municipal bond issues comply
See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 1090-1097 (West 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, §§ 3-
101 to 3-108 (Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE §§ 8-27-22 (1976), 13-2C-20 (1979), 13-2D-18 (1979),
16-26-21 (1979), 29-18-22 (1976), 31r15-12 (1975). See generally 2 J. DILLON, COMMErrARIES
ON THE LAW OF MutrcnAL CORPORATIONS § 772 (5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as DILLON].
Both common and statutory law prohibit public officials' conflicts of interests. See
Trainer v. City of Covington, 183 Ga. 759, _, 189 S.E. 842, 842 (1937) (common law
prohibition); Githens v. Butler County, 350 Mo. 295, ._ , 165 S.W.2d 650, 652 (1942) (statu-
tory prohibition). In Githens, a statute provided that no county official should be interested,
directly or indirectly, in any county contracts. Id. at _, 165 S.W.2d at 652. The defendant
was a member of a county board which approved the sale of county property to the defen-
dant's wife. Id. at __.- 165 S.W.2d at 651. The court found that the defendant's interest in
the property purchased by his wife v~as prohibited under the statute, reasoning that the
opportunity existed for self-dealing in public office. Id. at , 165 S.W.2d at 652-53. The
court held the contract of sale void. Id.
2 See, e.g., Henderson v. McCormick, 70 Ariz. 19, _ 215 P.2d 608, 610 (1950) (contract
voidable under statute); Trainer v. City of Covington, 183 Ga. 759, -, 189 S.E. 842, 842
(1937) (contract void at common law). The purpose of the "void or voidable" rule is to
discourage the exercise of conflicting interests. See text accompanying notes 9 & 12 infra.
Therefore, the Trainer court, relying on the common law rule that municipal contracts
tainted by conflicts of interests are void, struck down a contract between a city and its mayor
for the purchase of a truck by the city. 183 Ga. at ____ 189 S.E. at 842. In Henderson, a state
statute provided that city councilmen should not be interested in any sale made by them in
their official capacity. 70 Ariz. at _ 215 P.2d at 610. The statute further provided that a
prohibited sale might be avoided at the instance of any person except the interested party.
Id. A city councilman's agent purchased a truck from the city and local taxpayers brought
suit to set aside the sale. Id. at _ 215 P.2d at 609. The court concluded that the taxpayer
failed to show any financial loss resulting from the sale, and, therefore, had no standing to
sue for recission of the sale. Id. at ___, 215 P.2d at 611.
Statutes which render contracts tainted by conflicting interests voidable represent a
significant departure from the stringent common law rule nullifying such contracts. As the
Henderson case illustrates, the statutory "voidable" rule provides courts with some discretion
in determining whether tainted municipal contracts, especially those advantageous to the
municipality, should be avoided. See 70 Ariz. at _ 215 P.2d at 611. Where a contract is
void under common law principles, an action for recovery in quantum meruitmay be allowed,
but where a contract is avoided under statute, an action brought in quantum meruit will
likely be denied. See Heese v. Wenke, 161 Neb. 311, -, 73 N.W.2d 223, 226-27 (1955). The
distinction apparently is founded on the proposition that the public is presumed to know the
written law while knowledge of common law principles arising out of public policy cannot
fairly be presumed, especially where such presumption might operate to deprive an individual
of his property. See Town of Boca Raton v. Raulerson, 108 Fla. 376, _, 146 So. 576, 576-77-
(1933). See generally Note, Conflict of Interests: State Government Employees, 47 VA. L. Rv.
1034 (1961) [hereinafter cited as State Government Employees].
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with requirements of law should consider the possible effect of conflicts of
interests on the validity of such issues.' The existence of conflicts of inter-
ests in contracts underlying the issuance of municipal bonds may render
the bonds void or voidable. Thus, bond counsel should familiarize them-
selves with methods which will insulate municipal bonds from challenges
based on conflicting interests.4
Public policy forbids a public official's misconduct in office. A public
official must serve only the public interest and may not abandon his duty
in order to pursue personal interests at the expense of his constituency. 5
Common law and statutory prohibitions of conflicts of interests have devel-
oped in support of this policy.6 In addition, the judiciary has created a
prophylactic rule which voids municipal contracts tainted by conflicts of
interests.7 Courts have consistently applied the rule to supplement state
3 See text accompanying notes 24-70 infra. See also W. VA. CODE 4§ 13-2C-20 (1979), 13-
2D-18 (1979). Section 13-2C-20 provides in pertinent part:
No member of... the governing body of a municipality issuing revenue bonds.
shall have any financial interest, directly or indirectly, in the leasing, sale or other
disposition of an industrial project or commercial project acquired, constructed or
financed pursuant to [the Industrial Development and Commercial Development
Bond Act].
The question arises whether a violation of these provisions is intended to invalidate issued
bonds. See text accompanying notes 68-70 infra; cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159C-16 (1976) (viola-
tion of conflicts of interests provision has no effect on validity of bonds issued).
See text accompanying notes 71-91 infra. For an overview of the law relating to munici-
pal bond financing, particularly the validity of bonds issued and the rights of holders, see 2
DILLON, supra note 1, §§ 870-961; 15 E. McQuiLuN, THE LAW OF MUNIMAL CORPORATIONS §§
43.01-43.161 (Rev. 3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as McQuILLN]. For an introduction to the
practice of the municipal bond lawyers, see Greenberg, Municipal Securities: Some Basic
Principles and Practices, 9 URB. LAW. 338 (1977); INvEsTMENT BANKERs ASSOCIATION OF AMER-
ICA, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNIciPAL BoNDs 121 (6th ed. 1968).
' See Mayor of Ensley v. J.E. Hollingsworth & Co., 170 Ala. 396, -, 54 So. 95, 96
(1910); Strowbridge v. City of Chiloquin, 130 Or. 444, -, 280 P. 657, 658 (1929). In Ensley,
a city councilman was a partner in a firm contracting with the city for sewer construction.
170 Ala. at -, 54 So. at 96. The court concluded that the councilman had the duty to act
in the interest of the municipality in negotiating the contract. Id. However, his partnership
interest in the contract created a conflict between his personal interests and his public duty.
Id. The court held the contract void as against public policy. Id.
I See note 1 supra. The prohibition of public officials' conflicts of interests arises out of
theory borrowed from the law of trusts. State Government Employees, supra note 2, at 1034.
A public official stands in a fiduciary relationship to the public. Id. See 2 DILLON, supra note
1, § 772; 10 McQuILLIN, supra note 4, § 29.97.
' See City of Bristol v. Dominion Nat'l Bank, 153 Va. 71, -, 149 S.E. 632, 634 (1929);
Cimino v. Board of Educ., - W. Va. -, -, 210 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1974). In Bristol, the
city entered a contract with one of its councilmen and others to exempt certain property from
taxes. 153 Va. at 74-75, 149 S.E. at 632. A portion of the exempt property was owned by the
councilman. Id. The court concluded that the councilman's participation in making the
contract with himself was against public policy because of the temptation it created to profit
through self-dealing. Id. at 79-80, 149 S.E. at 636. Therefore, the contract was not enforceable
against the municipality. Id.
Municipal contracts tainted by prohibited interests generally are void even though the
interested party did not approve the contract or otherwise participate in its negotiation. See
Trainer v. City of Covington, 183 Ga. 759, _ 189 S.E. 842, 842-43 (1937). Whether the
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constitutional' and statutory9 prohibitions of conflicts of interests where
necessary to enforce public policy.0
contract is fair, free from fraud or even the best available opportunity for the municipality is
of no consequence in determining the contract's validity. Id. See also 2 DILLON, supra note 1,
§ 773.
Although the result may be harsh, common law and statutory prohibitions of conflicts
of interests are strictly enforced. Some courts seek to remove any opportunity for abuse of
the public trust. See State v. City of Cape May, 60 N.J.L. 78, _ 36 A. 1089, 1090 (1897).
In Cape May, the city council entered into a contract with a private company for the city's
lighting. A council member held one share of the contracting company's stock as collateral
for a debt owed him. Id. at _ , 36 A. at 1091. The applicable conflict of interests statute
did not discriminate as to the type or size of interests prohibited. Id. The court held the
councilman's interest prohibited, concluding that measuring the different effects a given
interest might have on different minds was impossible. Id. Since an illegal conflict of interest
was present, the contract was void. Id. Other courts seem intent on removing even the
appearance of impropriety in government. See State Government Employees, supra note 2,
at 1034.
' See, e.g., Miss. CONsT. art. 4, § 109. Section 109 provides that no public official shall
be interested, directly or indirectly, in any municipal contract authorized by a governmental
body of which he is a member. Id. This provision represents a broad constitutional prohibition
of public officials' conflicts of interests. Most constitutional conflicts of interests provisions
prohibit only public officials' interests in government printing and supply contracts. See, e.g.,
ARK. CONST. amend. 54; Ky. CONST. § 247.
' See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, §§ 3-101 to 3-108 (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-
347 to 2.1-358 (1979). State statutes vary in their approaches to the problem of protecting
government from the misconduct of public officials. Some state codes include a general
conflict of interests provision which applies to all phases of government activity. See, e.g.,
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 1090-1097 (West 1966); Virginia Conflict of Interests Act, VA. CODE §§
2.1-347 to 2.1-358 (1979). Other states attempt to prevent conflicts of interests in specific
situations. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 8-27-22 (1976), 13-2C-20 (1979), 13-2D-18 (1979), 16-26-
21 (1979), 29-18-22 (1976), 31-15-12 (1975). Some states employ a combined approach. See
MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, §§ 3-101 to 3-108 (Supp. 1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, §§ 30-32
(1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 14, 266 AA, 266 HH-12 (1978).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, §§ 3-101 to 3-108 (Supp. 1979) represent a well-planned ap-
proach to the problem of public officials' conflicts of interests. Section 3-101 of this article is
an extremely broad prohibition of government employees' conflicts of interests. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 40A, § 3-101 (Supp. 1979). A public officer or employee may not participate in any
matter in which he or a member of his immediate family has an interest or in which an
organization of which he is an owner or employee is a party. Id. The term "interest" includes
both financial and pure employment interests. Id.
11 See Rogers v. Sangster, 180 Ark. 907, -, 23 S.W.2d 613, 614 (1930); City of Bristol
v. Dominion Nat'l Bank, 153 Va. 71, 78, 149 S.E. 632, 634 (1929). The principal reason for
supplementing conflict of interests statutes with the common law is the public policy of
protecting government from self-dealing by public officials. See id.; text accompanying notes
5 & 6 supra. For example, in City of Bristol, the city entered a contract with a group of
individuals, including a city councilman, to exempt certain property from taxes. 153 Va. at
74-75, 149 S.E. at 633. The councilman had abstained from voting on the contract because
of his interest in the property. Id. at 74, 149 S.E. at 633. A state statute provided that no
councilman should be interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract to be performed by
the city he represented. Id. at 78, 149 S.E. at 634. The court read the statute in light of the
common law which provides that contracts tainted by conflicting interests are void even
though the interested party has not voted for approval of the contract. Id. at 79-80, 149 S.E.
at 634-35. The court cited public policy as the basis for its construction of the statute and
held the contract void. Id. at 80, 149 S.E. at 635.
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Common law and statutes generally define a prohibited interest as a
personal, financial interest in municipal contracts." In order to constitute
a financial interest, an interest must offer an opportunity for profit.'2
Therefore, courts have prohibited shareholders' interests,' 3 partners' inter-
ests,'4 and employee interests in compensation dependent on employer
profitability.'" Some statutes, however, prohibit "any" interest or "being
interested," omitting the word "financial."'" Under these statutes, the
range of prohibited interests is potentially much broader than at common
law because interests which do not afford an opportunity for profit may
come within the purview of the statute."Common and statutory law forbid
public officials' interests in municipal contracts whether direct or indi-
rect." Direct interests include an individual's interest in a personal con-
" See City of Stuart v. Green, 156 Fla. 551, -, 23 So. 2d 831, 834 (1945); W. VA. CODE
§ 13-2C-20 (1979). Even where a statute expressly prohibits "any" interest in government
contracts, courts may read the statute to prohibit only financial interests. See Mumma v.
Town of Brewster, 174 Wash. 112, 116, 24 P.2d 438, 440 (1933). But see Miller v. City of
Martinez, 28 Cal. App. 2d 364, -, 82 P.2d 519, 522 (1938) (disqualifying interest need not
be financial); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-101 (Supp. 1979); text accompanying notes 18 &
19 infra.
12 See Martin Bros. v. City of Concord, 110 Cal. App. 2d 215, -, 242 P.2d 406, 407
(1952).
," See, e.g., Ganntt v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 189 Ark. 449, -, 74 S.W.2d 232,
233 (1934).
" See, e.g., Mayor of Ensley v. J.E. Hollingsworth & Co., 170 Ala. 396, - , 54 So. 95,
96 (1910).
,5 See, e.g., Gland v. Mayor of North Arlington, 13 N.J. Misc. 521, -, 179 A. 380, 381
(1935); Mumma v. Town of Brewster, 174 Wash. 112, 116-17, 24 P.2d 438, 440 (1933).
Financial interests may take many other forms. See, e.g., People v. Becker, 112 Cal. App.
2d 324, -, 246 P.2d 103, 104-05 (1952) (interest in insurance commissions paid on policy
issued to corporation engaged in busing school children); Githens v. Butler County, 350 Mo.
295, -, 165 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (1942) (husband's interest in wife's purchase of property
from municipality).
" See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266 AA (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-234 (1969).
See 2 DILLON, supra note 1, at 1146 n.1; note 11 supra. Courts have taken two approaches to
construction of statutes prohibiting "any interest" or "being interested." Compare Panozzo
v. City of Rockford, 306 Ill. App. 443, -, 28 N.E.2d 748, 752-53 (1940) and Ganntt v.
Arkansas Power & Light Co., 189 Ark. 449, -, 74 S.W.2d 232, 233 (1934) with Edward E.
Gillen Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 174 Wis. 362, -, 183 N.W. 679, 681 (1921). The Panozzo
court concluded that a state statute prohibiting "any" interest should be interpreted to
preclude only "financial" interests in conformity with the common law. 306 Ill. App. at
28 N.E. 2d at 752-53. Although a pure employment interest is not usually considered a
financial interest, the Gillen court concluded that such an interest was prohibited under a
statute which forbade "being interested" in certain contracts. 183 N.W. at 681.
"1 See Byrne & Speed Coal Co. v. City of Louisville, 189 Ky. 346, __, 224 S.W. 883,
884 (1920); Edward E. Gillen Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 174 Wis. 362, _, 183 N.W. 679,
681 (1921); note 16 supra. In Byrne, an employee of a coal company contracting with the city
was also a member of the city council. 224 S.W. at 884. His interest as an employee was
expressly prohibited under a statute providing that councilmen should not be directly or
indirectly interested in any contract with the city. Id. A number of states have narrowed the
coverage of these statutes by establishing a minimum value for interests prohibited. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 159C-16 (Supp. 1979).
" See Arthur v. Trindel, 168 Neb. 429, 438, 96 N.W.2d 208, 215 (1959) (statutory prohibi-
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tract with a municipality,' 9 an owner's interest in a business contracting
with a municipality,"0 and an employee's interest in the profits of a busi-
ness contracting with a municipality.2' An indirect interest includes any
financial interest which might affect a public official's independent judg-
ment in contracting on behalf of a municipality.22 The definition of indirect
interests provides courts with broad discretion in protecting the govern-
ment from abuse by public officials. Thus, the connection between a public
official's personal interest and a municipal contract may be attenuated,
yet result in a prohibited interest.2
Although a municipality may avoid its obligations under municipal
contracts tainted by conflicts of interests, the question remains whether
the taint of conflicting interests will permit an issuer of municipal bonds
to avoid its obligations on such bonds. When considering the effect of
government misconduct on the validity of bonds, courts and legislatures
treat municipal bonds differently from other municipal contracts for pub-
lic policy reasons. Public policy requires that municipal officials deal fairly
with the public, including bond purchasers. A municipality may not bor-
tion); Terry v. Bender, 143 Cal. App. 2d 198, 206-07, 300 P.2d 119, 125 (1956) (statutory
prohibition discussed in light of common law derivation). See generally State Government
Employees, supra note 2, at 1042-44. The question addressed by the prohibition of direct or
indirect interests is the proximity of personal interest to government activity. See text accom-
panying notes 24 & 25 infra. A small minority of courts also have considered the size of a
personal financial interest in determining whether the interest should be prohibited. See
Bourne v. Sullivan, 104 N.H. 348, -, 186 A.2d 834, 838 (1962); Jordan v. McCourt, 135
W. Va. 79, _ , 62 S.E.2d 555, 561 (1950) (sale of bolts and rivets worth $1.30 considered de
minimis). But see State v. City of Cape May, 60 N.J.L. 78, ,36 A. 1089, 1090 (1897) (one
share of stock held as collateral for debt constitutes prohibited interest). Moreover, where the
interest of a public official is shared generally by his constituents, such as a community's
interest in a contract for the lighting of city streets, such interest will not constitute a
prohibited interest. See Beale v. City of Santa Barbara, 32 Cal. App. 235, -, 162 P. 657,
661 (1916); Downs v. Mayor of South Amboy, 116 N.J.L. 511, -, 185 A. 15, 15-17 (1936).
" See, e.g., Town of Boca Raton v. Raulerson, 108 Fla. 376, -, 146 So. 576, 577 (1933)
(voiding town commissioner's sale of real estate to town); Trainer v. City of Covington, 183
Ga. 759, _ , 189 S.E. 842, 842 (1937) (mayor's sale of truck to city held void).
21 See, e.g., Douglas v. Pittman, 239 Ky. 548, -, 39 S.W.2d 979, 981 (1931) (board of
education member's ownership interest in company contracting with board prohibited under
statute).
" See, e.g., Gland v. Mayor of North Arlington, 13 N.J. Misc. 521,_ , 179 A. 380, 380-
81 (1935) (city councilman's employment interest in accounting firm contracting with city
for services renders such contract void).
22 Terry v. Bender, 143 Cal. App. 2d 198, 206-07, 300 P.2d 119, 125 (1956). Although
direct interests are often quite obvious and their potential for conflict with public duty
apparent, indirect interests are not so easily managed. Consequently, the courts have broadly
defined indirect interests and have struck down most interests which present the possibility
for abuse of public trust. See, e.g., People v. Becker, 112 Cal. App. 2d 324, __, 246 P.2d
103, 104-05 (1952).
" See State Government Employees, supra note 2, at 1034; note 22 supra. Some courts
may use the flexibility inherent in the concept of prohibited indirect interests to remove the
mere appearance of impropriety in government. State Government Employees, supra note 2,
at 1034.
1980]
206 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII
row from the innocent public and later refuse to repay on the ground that
the bonds issued are invalid because tainted by government misconduct.24
Furthermore, the efficient operation of government depends heavily on
access to favorable financial markets.2 If the existence of official miscon-
duct invalidated municipal bonds, purchasers would be required to inves-
tigate every facet of bond issuance to discover irregularity. 2 Placing the
responsibility of personal investigation on purchasers would impede mu-
nicipal borrowing, limit the transferability of municipal bonds, and ulti-
mately impair bond values.Y Therefore, courts have protected bona fide
holders of municipal bonds from financial loss resulting from defects in the
bonds.
Under the common law doctrine of estoppel, a municipal issuer may not
contest the validity of its bonds in the hands of a bona fide holder. or his
24 Bissell v. City of Jeffersonville, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 287, 299-300 (1860). See Driscoll v.
Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, _ 86 A.2d 201, 226, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838
(1952). In Driscoll, a county commission had sold municipal revenue bonds to finance pur-
chases of two bridges by the commission. Id. at -, 86 A.2d at 216. Alleging that the
purchases contravened public policy, plaintiffs brought an action for recission. Id. at
86 A.2d at 207. The court found that irregularity in the purchase of the bridges amounted to
an abuse of the public trust, id. at _ 86 A.2d at 221, and concluded that the purchases
should be set aside to the fullest extent possible, consistent with the rights of bond purchasers
qualifying as holders in due course. Id. at -, 86 A.2d at 226. The bonds were enforceable
in the hands of holders in due course, even though the bonds were wrongfully disposed of by
public officials and notwithstanding irregularity, fraud or misconduct on the part of those
involved in the purchase of the bridges. Id. The court ruled, however, that bonds held by those
purchasers not qualifying as holders in due course were void and no obligation was to be
recognized thereon. Id. at -, 86 A.2d at 235. The purchases underlying the bond issue were
also void, but only to the extent that sellers of the bridge properties were required to disgorge
their profits on the transactions. Id. at -, 86 A.2d at 234.
Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, - , 86 A.2d 201, 226 (1952).
26 Id.
" See id. The Driscoll court reasoned that since municipal bond markets are geographi-
cally broad, it would be impractical in most cases for a purchaser to make the investigation
necessary to protect himself from loss due to the invalidity of bonds. 8 N.J. at -, 86 A.2d
at 226. An investigation requirement prior to purchase of municipal bonds would, therefore,
restrict bond markets. Id. Furthermore, if the court were to invalidate municipal bonds
because of irregularity in their issuance, municipalities would lose their access to favorable
financial markets because of shaken investor confidence. Id. The court, therefore, concluded
that it should not readily create exceptions to the general rule that a municipality may not
challenge the validity of its securities in the hands of bona fide holders. Id.
2 See Cairo v. Zane, 149 U.S. 122, 141 (1893); Anderson County Comm'rs v. Beal, 113
U.S. 227, 240 (1885). The common law rule of estoppel is founded on public policy of protect-
ing innocent purchasers from official misconduct and protecting municipal access to finan-
cial markets. See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, -, -, 86 A.2d
201, 222, 226 (1952); text accompanying notes 24-27 supra. See generally Powe, Rehearsal for
Substantive Due Process: The Municipal Bond Cases, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 738 (1975). The
strength of the estoppel doctrine is exemplified by Mercer County v. Hacket, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
83 (1863). In Mercer, a Pennsylvania county issued bonds to finance construction of a rail
line through the county. Id. at 83-84. The county attempted to show that the county commis-
sioners had acted illegally in issuing the bonds. Id. at 86-87. The court held that as long as
the bonds on their face did not betray non-compliance with the law authorizing issuance,
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successor. "9 A bona fide holder is a good faith" purchaser for value ' without
notice of any defect " in the bonds. The determination of bona fide holder
status often turns on the issue of "notice of defect."33 Courts charge pur-
chasers with notice of constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing
the issuance of municipal bonds" and all matters disclosed on the face of
such bonds." If a purchaser has actual notice of any defect in municipal
bonds or is charged with such notice, he will not qualify as a bona fide
holder.3" Courts, however, do not charge purchasers with notice of fraud,
Hacket, who was a non-resident, and other purchasers were not bound to search facts sur-
rounding issuance of the bonds to discover defects in the bonds. Id. at 96. See generally 2
DILLON, supra note 1, at 1351-52; 15 McQuaiN, supra note 4, §§ 43.78-43.161.
" See Hackett v. Ottawa, 99 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1878) (bona fide holder defined); Board of
Educ. of Carmen v. James, 49 F.2d 91, 102 (10th Cir. 1931) (transferee of bona fide holder
entitled to iights of such holder even though not otherwise qualified as bona fide holder). But
see'Bolton v. Wharton, 163 S.C. 242, -, 161 S.E. 454, 457-58 (1931) (bona fide holder is
second or subsequent holder; original purchaser cannot qualify). See generally 2 DMLON,
supra note 1, § 931.
" "Good faith" is honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. See Siano v. Helvering, 13 F. Supp. 776, 780
(D.N.J. 1936); note 52 infra.
3' Negotiable Instruments Law § 25 (1896) defines "value" as any consideration suffi-
cient to support a simple contract including an antecedent debt. See F. BEUTEL, BRANNAN'S
NEGOTIABLE INsTRummrs LAw, § 25 at 128 (7th ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as BEuTEL]. See
note 63 infra.
32 Negotiable Instruments Law § 56 (1896) defines "notice of defect" as actual knowledge
of the defect or knowledge of such facts that one's actions in taking an instrument amount
to bad faith. See BEUTEL, supra note 31, § 56 at 140.
33 See, e.g., Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, -. 86 A.2d 201, 224-
26 (1952) (applying Negotiable Instruments Law § 57 (1896)). See notes 24 & 32 supra; note
47 infra.
21 See Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Florala, 63 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 630 (1933) (statutory provision); Union Bank of Richmond v. Commissioners of
Oxford, 119 N.C. 214, _ 25 S.E. 966, 967-70 (1896) (constitutional provision). See
generally 2 DILLON, supra note 1, §§ 889-99 (particularly §§ 889 & 897).
Where there is no constitutional or statutory authority for the issuance of bonds, purchas-
ers are charged with notice of the lack of authority and the consequent illegality of the bonds.
See Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Florala, 63 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1933). In Life & Casualty
Ins. Co., appellant insurance company brought suit on street improvement bonds issued by
a municipality for payment of principal and interest due. Id. at 196. A statute conferred power
on the municipality to issue the bonds. Id. at 197. The statute, however, also provided that
the bonds were not to be general obligations of the city, and set out those parties who were
to be liable on the bonds. Id. at 197-98. The court concluded that the city was without power
to incur the liability asserted by the appellant, held the apellant charged with notice of lack
of authority, and denied recovery. Id. at 198.
Several courts have followed an alternative theory to reach the same result. These courts
avoid the "notice" question by simply stating that bonds issued in the absence of municipal
power to incur indebtedness or issue securities are void in their -inception. See Barnett v.
Denison, 145 U.S. 135, 139, 140 (1892); Louisiana Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of
Supervisors, 202 La. 176, _ 11 So. 2d 521, 523-24 (1942).
3' See McClure v. Township of Oxford, 94 U.S. 429, 433 (1876); City of McLaughlin v.
Turgeon, 75 F.2d 402, 406 (8th Cir. 1935).
u See, e.g., Nesbit v. Riverside Independent Dist., 144 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1892); notes 34
1980]
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misconduct, or similar irregularities in the issuance of municipal bonds.37
In order to protect innocent purchasers and prevent disruption of munici-
pal financial markets, the few courts which have considered the effect of
conflicting interests on municipal bonds have applied common law estop-
pel to prevent the municipality's challenge to the validity of its bonds in
the hands of bona fide purchasers."
Estoppel by recital, a derivative of the more general common law estop-
pel, may provide additional protection for bona fide holders of municipal
bonds. 9 Municipal issuers often recite, or state on the face of bonds, that
all legal requirements for bond issuance have been met.4" The rule of estop-
pel by recital provides that, if a municipality has the power to issue bonds,
the municipality may not challenge the truth of its recitals even if the
power of issuance has been improperly exercised. 4 Thus the doctrine of
& 35 supra. The Nesbit Court stated that a holder of municipal bonds was bound to take
notice of the amount of taxable property within the municipality at the date of issuance of
the bonds and was charged with knowledge of the overissuance of the bonds. Id. at 618. See
15 McQuiLLiN, supra note 4, §§ 43-82 to 43-86.
3 See Mercer County v. Hacket, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 83 (1863); Driscoll v. Burlington-
Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, _ 86 A.2d 201, 226 (1952). Although there was blatant fraud
in the issuance of municipal bonds in Mercer, the Supreme Court concluded that the bonds
were valid in the hands of bona fide purchasers because of the "necessities of commerce." 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) at 95-96. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra (policy underlying common
law doctrine of estoppel). See also 15 McQuuLLIN, supra note 4, §§ 43.93 & 43.95.
u See Hewitt v. Board of Educ., 94 Ill. 528, 533 (1880); Sherlock v. Village of Winnetka,
59 ll. 389, 399-400 (1871), modified on other grounds, 68 Ill. 530 (1873). Since the issuer sets
the price of bonds to be sold and therefore establishes the return on investment in the bonds,
an opportunity exists for abuse of public trust by public officials who could set the price of
the bonds and reap substantial financial gains by selling the bonds to themselves. Therefore,
bonds sold by a municipality to public officials who approve their issuance are void. Id. at
399. However, bonds in the hands of the general public (bona fide purchasers) are valid under
the common law doctrine of estoppel. Id. at 399-400. In essence, courts have taken the
approach that obligations on bonds tainted by conflicts of interests may be avoided by the
issuer to the extent that such avoidance is consistent with the rights of innocent purchasers
which must be honored. See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, -, 86
A.2d 201, 226 (1952).
" See generally 2 DILLON, supra note 1, §§ 904-930; 15 McQunLLIN, supra note 4, § § 43.97-
43.116.
40 See 15 McQUILLIN, supra note 4, § 43.97 at 647.
41 Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1876). See Gunnison County Comm'rs
v. Rollins, 173 U.S. 255, 273 (1899); Chaffee County v. Potter, 142 U.S. 355, 364-65 (1892)
(quoting Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U.S. 484, 491 (1876)). See also 2 DILLON, supra note 1,
§ 908. In Coloma, municipal bonds were issued pursuant to a statute providing that bonds
could be issued only on approval by popular vote of the township. 92 U.S. at 486. The bonds
recited compliance with the voting requirement. Id. at 490. The Court concluded that where
legislative authority was given for issuance of the bonds and where it might be inferred from
the statute that representatives of the issuer had the power to determine whether conditions
precedent to issuance had been met, recital of satisfaction of conditions precedent would be
binding on the municipality as against bona fide purchasers. Id. at 491-92. The Court consid-
ered Dillon's statement of the rule of estoppel by recital too conservative. Id. at 491. Accord-
ing to Dillon, recitals of substantial compliance would preclude an issuer's defense of invalid-
ity only where statute expressly conferred the power to make such a determination. See 2
DILLON, supra note 1, §§ 908 & 909.
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estoppel by recital usually will afford protection coextensive with that
provided by the more general common law estoppel.2 The protection af-
forded by the two forms of estoppel differ only when the issuer has failed
to comply substantially with conditions precedent to issuance of bonds.
Under the general common law doctrine of estoppel, failure to comply
substantially with conditions precedent to issuance set forth in enabling
constitutional and statutory provisions may invalidate bonds.43 Under the
doctrine of estoppel by recital, recitals will preclude an issuer's defense to
the validity of bonds despite failure of substantial compliance.44 The rule
of estoppel by recital will not prevent the issuer's denial of authority to
issue bonds" or protect purchasers if non-compliance with the law is dis-
closed on the face of the bonds."
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) codified the common
law doctrines of estoppel and estoppel by recital. Section 8-202(2) is central
to the protection afforded holders of challenged securities under the UCC.47
However, section 8-202(2) protects only purchasers48 for value49 without
1 See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, . 86 A.2d 201, 226-27
(1952).
"3 See Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Mercer County, 170 U.S. 593, 600 (1898). But see
Commissioners of Knox v. Aspinwall; 62 U.S. (21 How.) 539, 544-45 (1859). Courts favor
constitutional and statutory construction which avoids invalidating securities for failure of
substantial compliance with conditions precedent to their issuance. Provident Life & Trust
Co. v. Mercer County, 170 U.S. 593, 600 (1898). But see Brenham v. German American Bank,
144 U.S. 173, 182 (1891).
" See Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U.S. 484, 490-92 (1876).
" See Katzenbach v. Aberdeen, 121 U.S. 172, 176 (1887); Union Bank of Richmond v.
Commissioners of Oxford, 119 N.C. 214, -, 25 S.E. 966, 969-70 (1896).
" See Chaffee County v. Potter, 142 U.S. 355, 364 (1892) (issuer not bound by recital if
information on face of bond discloses that recital is false); Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v.
Oakland County, 264 Mich. 673, _ 251 N.W. 395, 399 (1933). See also text accompanying
note 35 supra.
47 U.C.C. § 8-202(2) provides that a municipal security in'the hands of a purchaser for
value without notice of a defect going to the security's validity is valid
if either there has been substantial compliance with legal requirements governing
the issue or the issuer has received a substantial consideration for the issue as a
whole or for the particular security and a stated purpose of the issue is one for which
the issuer has power to borrow money or issue the security.
If a defect in the security involves a violation of state constitutional provisions, however, the
security may not be valid in the hands of the original purchaser, but is valid in the hands of
a subsequent purchaser for value without notice of the defect. Id.
The statutory predecessor of U.C.C. § 8-202(2) was Negotiable Instruments Law § 57 (1896)
which provided:
A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior
parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and
may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all
parties liable thereon. F, V
Negotiable Instruments-Law § 57 was adopted in all fifty states with minor modifica-
tions, see BEUTEL, supra note 31, at 1353-54, 1362-83; however, this section and the Negotiable
Instruments Law were largely ignored by the courts which tended to rely on the common law
rules of estoppel and estoppel by recital. See id. at 8, 823-32.
19 U.C.C. § 1-201 (32), (33).
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notice" of any defect going to the validity of securities. 1 The UCC discon-
tinues the common law requirement of good faith" and, in contrast to the
common law, defines notice in terms of an objective standard. A purchaser
has notice if, from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the
time of issuance, he has reason to know of a defect in a security."
Generally, a municipal issuer" of certificated securities55 may not chal-
lenge their validity if the securities are held by purchasers for value with-
out notice of any defect going to the validity of such securities. There are,
however, four exceptions to the general rule. First, a municipal issuer of
bonds may invoke the defense of invalidity against an original purchaser
if the bond issue violates state constitutional provisions,57 but the issuer
may not assert the defense against a subsequent purchaser.58 The special
status conferred on subsequent purchasers does not exist under common
law which invalidates constitutionally defective bonds in the hands of any
purchaser.59 Second, section 8-202(2) will preclude a municipal issuer's
49 U.C.C. § 1-201(44).
50 U.C.C. § 1-201(25).
51 See U.C.C. §§ 8-104 & 8-202(2), (3). The phrase "defect going to the validity of a
security" is not defined in the U.C.C. In such a case, guidance may be found in the common
law. See U.C.C. § 1-103. Fraud, misconduct, and irregularity in the issuance of securities and
lack of power of issuance represent a few of the defects which may "go to the validity of
securities." See generally text accompanying notes 28-48 supra.
52 The deletion of the good faith requirement is not explained in the Code. See U.C.C. §
8-202(2), Comments; cf. U.C.C. § 8-302 (good faith requirement employed in situations
involving rights acquired by purchaser of securities). See also text accompanying notes 28-32
& 39 supra.
53 U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(c).
54 See U.C.C. § 8-201. The term "issuer," with respect to defenses to a security, includes
persons who become responsible for or in place of any other person described as an issuer
under U.C.C. § 8-201. U.C.C. § 8-201(1)(d). This definition apparently is broad enough to
include a pass-through obligor in an industrial revenue or pollution control financing. See id.
A pass-through obligor is a corporation or other entity which agrees to make payments to a
municipality sufficient to cover repayment of bonds issued by the municipality. The agree-
ment is made in return for use of equipment purchased or constructed by the municipality
with proceeds of the bonds issued.
U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a). The term "certificated security" includes any obligation of an
issuer which is represented by an instrument issued in bearer or registered form, of a type
commonly traded in securities markets, and one of a class or series of obligations. Id. The
definition is broad enough to include the vast majority of municipal bonds issued. See id.
Purchasers of uncertificated securities are also protected by U.C.C. § 8-202(2) if the purchaser
has received an initial transaction statement. See U.C.C. §§ 8-102(1)(b) & 8-408. See
generally Bankhaus Herman Lampe KG v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co., ACF, 466
F. Supp. 1133, 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
56 U.C.C. § 8-202(2).
57 U.C.C. § 8-202(2). jhe drafters of Article 8 stated that, in the event of a constitutional
defect in securities, the rights of an original purchaser are determined by reference to state
law. See U.C.C. § 8-202(2), Comment 3. No negative implication is intended by a grant of
rights to a subsequent purchaser. Id.
U.C.C. § 8-202(2). See U.C.C. § 8-102(2).
5, See Citizens' Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Perry County, 156 U.S. 692, 701-02 (1895)
(constitutional defect gives rise to issuer's defense of invalidity against even bona fide holder);
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defense to the validity of its bonds only if one of two conditions is present.
The issuer must have substantially complied with the legal requirements
governing the issue."0 Alternatively, the issuer must have received a
"substantial" consideration for the issue as a whole or for the particular
bond and a stated purpose of the issue must have been one for which the
issuer had power to borrow money or issue bonds.' These conditions
merely codify common law estoppel and estoppel by recital theory relating
to municipal issuers.62 A third exception to the general rule that municipal
issuers may not challenge the validity of their bonds allows an issuer to
raise the defense of lack of genuineness to counterfeit or forged securities. 3
Finally, an issuer may raise the defense of overissue." Section 8-104(1)
states that provisions of Article 8 which validate securities, including sec-
tion 8-202(2), do not apply to the extent that validation would result in
overissue. Overissue is, therefore, a defense to the validity of that portion
of an issue which exceeds constitutional or statutory limits.65
The protection afforded purchasers by section 8-202(2) against an is-
suer's defenses thus is limited. Section 8-202(2) protects only purchasers
for value without notice. Furthermore, an issuer may raise certain defenses
to the validity of its securities even in the hands of a purchaser for value
without notice. The taint of a conflict of interests in transactions underly-
ing the issuance of municipal bonds may establish two of these defenses,
violation of constitutional provisions and failure of substantial compliance.
Under section 8-202(2), a constitutional defect in a municipal bond
may be ground for an issuer's defense of invalidity against an original
purchaser. Since several state constitutions prohibit public officials' con-
flicts of interests in specified instances, the existence of constitutionally
prohibited interests in municipal bond issues might create an issuer's de-
fense to the validity of such bonds." In light of public policy and the
text accompanying notes 34 & 36 supra. The U.C.C. does not explain its departure from the
common law on this point. See U.C.C. § 8-202(2), Comment 3; note 53 supra.
" U.C.C. § 8-202(2); see note 39 supra.
" U.C.C. § 8-202(2).
42 See U.C.C. § 8-202(2), Comment 3. The comment states that "[a]s a practical mat-
ter, the problem of policing municipal issuers has been alleviated by the present practice of
requiring legal opinions as to the validity of [an] issue." Id. In other words, the drafters of §
8-202(2) were content to follow the common law "substantial compliance" and "power of
issuance" tests, which might interfere with efficient trading in municipal securities, since the
practice has developed that bond counsel, rather than individual purchasers, now investigate
compliance with legal requirements of issuance. See id.
U.C.C. § 8-202(3). See U.C.C. § 1-201(18).
" See U.C.C. § 8-104. "Overissue" is the issuance of securities in an amount exceeding
authorized limits. U.C.C. § 8-104(2).
" See U.C.C. § 8-104(1). The section is merely declaratory of the common law. See, e.g.,
Sutro v. Petit, 74 Cal. 332, -.. 16 P. 7, 8, 9 (1887). See 2 DI.LON, supra note 1, § 961.
" See, e.g., Miss. CONST. art. 4, § 109 (general prohibition of public officials' conflicts of
interests); Ky. CONST. § 247; MoNT. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (Supp. 1977); TEx. CONST. art. H,
§ 18; cf. ARK. CONsT. amend. 54 (conflicts of interests prohibited with respect to government
printing and supply contracts). See generally State Government Employees, supra note 2, at
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common law foundation of section 8-202(2), courts should avoid such a
reading of the statute.
At common law, courts charge purchasers with notice of constitutional
provisions authorizing municipal bond issues. However, purchasers need
not investigate facts and circumstances surrounding issuance to discover
the existence of irregularity or misconduct. This line of reasoning seeks to
accommodate public policy protecting innocent purchasers from financial
loss and bond markets from disruption." Courts should construe the con-
stitutional violation exception of section 8-202(2) in light of this history.
Although courts may charge purchasers with notice of a constitutional
conflict of interests prohibition, they should not charge purchasers with
discovery of such conflicts.
The existence of conflicting interests may also establish an issuer's
defense of failure of substantial compliance with the law governing an
issue.8 In light of the recent tendency of states to include conflict of inter-
ests prohibitions in municipal finance legislation, courts might interpret
such prohibitions as conditions precedent to issuance of municipal bonds. 9
Thus, the existence of a conflict of interests would constitute failure of
substantial compliance with the law governing issuance and might render
purchasers' protections under section 8-202(2) ineffective against a munici-
pal issuer. As a result, innocent purchasers would suffer loss of their invest-
ment and municipal bond markets would suffer the loss of investor confid-
ence.
Bond counsel, however, need not subject purchasers to this risk. Sec-
tion 8-202(2) provides bond counsel with an alternative method of ensuring
that the protections afforded purchasers under the subsection will be avail-
able against a municipal issuer's defenses. Counsel should require the
issuer to recite the purpose of the issue on the face of the bonds and make
1042 n.26. See also note 8 supra. Theoretically, proceeds from a municipal bond issue might
be used to make payments under government contracts tainted by a public official's conflict
of interests, giving rise to a connection between bonds issued and the conflict. The connection
between a conflict of interests and a bond issue would be strengthened in the case where the
interested official participates in negotiation and authorization of the sale of bonds. The
question then is whether the taint of a conflict of interests runs to bonds issued so as to create
a defect going to their validity within the meaning of U.C.C. § 8-202(2). If so and a state
constitution expressly prohibits the conflict of interests, a strict reading of U.C.C. § 8-202(2)
would leave the defense of invalidity of the bonds available to the issuer.
61 See text accompanying notes 24-27, 37 & 38 supra.
88 See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra; note 39 supra (common law background).
' See, e.g., Industrial Development and Commercial Development Bond Act, W. VA.
CODE §§ 13-2C-1 to 13-2C-20 (1979). The statute confers on counties and municipalities the
power to issue industrial revenue bonds to finance industrial and commercial projects. See
W. VA. CODE §§ 13-2C-4, 13-2C-7 (1979). Section 13-2C-20 provides that no member of a
county commission or municipal board issuing bonds shall have any financial interest in the
leasing, sale or other disposition of an industrial project financed pursuant to the act. See
W. VA. CODE § 13-2C-20 (1979). Therefore, the existence of a prohibited conflict of interests
may constitute failure of substantial compliance with the requirements of the Industrial
Development Act. See id; note 3 supra.
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sure that the purpose recited is one for which the issuer has power to issue
bonds .7
Since section 8-202(2) protects only purchasers for value without notice
and a conflict of interests may establish an issuer's defense even against
such purchasers, bond counsel must employ other methods of ensuring
that the taint of conflicts of interests will not invalidate bonds. The most
effective guarantee of validity is the prevention or removal of conflicting
interests. Therefore, bond counsel should collect the names of all public
officials and employees involved in any manner in the bond issuance proce-
dure.7 ' Counsel should determine whether any of the named individuals or
members of their immediate families have any personal interest in the
bond issue." Bond attorneys should also ascertain whether any of the
named persons have any interest in parties to contracts underlying the
bond issue, particularly an ownership or employment interest in such par-
ties. 3 Counsel must then measure any such interests against statutory
prohibitions to determine their legality.74 In many cases, however, discov-
ery of conflicting interests may not be practical or removal of the taint of
existing conflicts may not be possible.7 5 Other measures may offer the
purchaser more complete protection.
Bond counsel should not rely on statutory disclosure provisions to cure
conflicts of interests defects. Although statutes may require disclosure of
conflicts of interests, such statutes generally will not expressly provide that
disclosure will remove the taint of conflicts of interests from transactions
subject to such interests.7 8 Furthermore, counsel should not assume that
See U.C.C. § 8-202(2).
" See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-101 (Supp. 1979).
72 Id.
13 Id. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra..
' Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-101 (Supp. 1979) with VA. CODE § 2.1-349 (1970).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, §§ 3-101 to 3-108 (Supp. 1979) represent a broad prohibition of
state officials' and employees' conflicts of interests. For example, section 3-101 prohibits
family members' interests in municipal contracts. MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-101 (Supp.
1979). Many conflicts of interests statutes are not written so broadly. See, e.g., VA. CODE §
2.1-349 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 13-2C-20 (1979). Although the nature and extent of the conflicts
of interests investigation to be performed by counsel will depend on the applicable statutory
provision, counsel should be aware that such statutes are broadly construed. See note 10
supra. For example, although a statute nay not expressly prohibit interests of family mem-
bers in municipal contracts, courts are not likely to allow a public official to avoid a conflict
of interest by transferring his personal interest in a municipal contract to a member of his
immediate family. See Githens v. Butler County, 350 Mo. 295, -, 165 S.W.2d 650, 652-53
(1942).
," See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-101 (Supp. 1979). Under this section, a public
official's proffering of advice with respect to the issuance of municipal bonds may create a
conflict of interests. Id. This type of activity will often occur prior to bond counsel's involve-
ment in a financing, making discovery of such a conflict of interests difficult. See note 71
supra.
7 See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 2.1-349(a) (2), 2.1-350, 2.1-352 (1979). But see S.C. CODE § 4-9-
180 (1976). Section 4-9-180 provides that any county official who has a substantial financial
interest in any business which contracts with the county or personally contracts with the
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such statutes impliedly provide that disclosure will cure a conflict of inter-
ests defect. At common law, a public official's disclosure of his conflict of
interests prior to participation in negotiating and approving municipal
contracts will not save the contract from invalidity.
77
Validation proceedings, however, provide a reliable method of deter-
mining the validity of municipal bonds prior to their issuance s.7 A valida-
tion proceeding involves a judicial determination of any issues, including
constitutional questions, raised concerning the compliance of a bond issue
with requirements of law. 9 The purpose of validation proceedings is to
county shall disclose the interest and refrain from voting or otherwise participating in the
contracting process. Id. The contract is rendered voidable only if there has been a violation
of the section and the private contracting party knows of the violation. Id.
7 See Mayor of Ensley v. J.E. Hollingsworth & Co., 170 Ala. 396, -, 54 So. 95, 96-97
(1910); City of Bristol v. Dominion Nat'l Bank, 153 Va. 71, 79-80, 149 S.E. 632, 634-35 (1929).
The Ensley court decided that it was "of no moment that the plaintiff ... was not present,
or that 'he did not vote upon the acceptance of his bid,' at the meeting of the city council
.... " 170 Ala. at _ 54 So. at 96. In Bristol, the court concluded that even though the
interested party disclosed his interest and refrained from voting on a municipal contract, the
contract was void as against public policy. 153 Va. at 79-80, 149 S.E. at 634; see note 7 supra.
Is See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 87-301 to 87-315 (1979); VA. CODE §§ 15.1-213 to 15.1-215
(1973), § 15.1-216 (Supp. 1979), §§ 15.1-217 to 15.1-221 (1973). See generally 15 McQunLuN,
supra note 4, §§ 43.143-43.148. VA. CODE § 15.1-214 (1973) provides that the governing body
of any political subdivision proposing to issue bonds may bring a proceeding to establish the
validity of the bonds, the legality of all proceedings theretofore taken in connection with the
authorization or issuance of the bonds, and the validity of the method of payment of the
bonds. The governing body may bring the proceeding by filing a motion for judgment describ-
ing the bonds in question and the proceedings relating to issuance of such bonds and alleging
that the bonds, when issued, will be valid obligations of the issuer. Id. Section 15.1-214
requires joinder of all persons interested in or in any way affected by the issuance of the bonds
in the motion for judgment. Id.
Where there is no statutory authorization for validation proceedings, an action for valida-
tion may be brought under declaratory judgment law. See McNichols v. Denver, 101 Colo.
316, - , 74 P.2d 99, 102 (1937). See also 15 McQuamL, supra note 4, at 743. Occasionally,
statutory language may expressly provide that breach of a conflict of interests prohibition will
not affect the validity of bonds issued. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1102 (West 1966); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 159C-16 (1976). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 433 (1977).
1, See Thompson v. Town of Frostproof, 89 Fla. 92, -, 103 So. 118, 119 (1925); In re
Validation of $50,000 Serial Funding Bonds, 187 Miss. 512, -, 193 So. 449, 452 (1940). See
also Abell v. Town of Boynton, 95 Fla. 984, - , 117 So. 507, 509 (1928) (constitutional
validity of bonds tested). Validation proceedings provide courts with jurisdiction to determine
whether bonds to be issued are, in any respect, legally deficient. Thompson v. Town of
Frostproof, 89 Fla. at -, 103 So. at 119. For example, in Thompson, a lower court entered
a decree validating bonds issued to finance street construction. Id. at -, 103 So. at 118.
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the proposed construction was not a purpose for which bonds
could legally be issued. Id. After a determination that plaintiff's question might appropriately
be raised in a validation proceeding, the court agreed with plaintiff and reversed the lower
court decree. Id. Courts may also determine whether bond issues comply with constitutional
requirements. Rohde v. City of Newport, 246 Ky. 476, -, 55 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1932). In
Rohde, a statute provided for validation of municipal bonds and forbade issuance of bonds
until their constitutional validity had been tested in the courts. Id. at _, 55 S.W.2d at 369.
See generally 15 McQuILUN, supra note 4, at 748.
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protect the public from improper creation of municipal debts," to assure
the regularity of issuance and validity of municipal bonds," and to protect
the public's interest in stable, efficient markets for municipal obligations. 2
Courts have held statutes authorizing validation proceedings constitu-
tional3 and their procedural elements consistent with the requirements of
due process."'
Statutes generally provide that the state or one of its political subdivi-
sions may bring an action for validation of municipal securites.85 Named
defendants in a validation proceeding may include the issuer, its citizens
and, where appropriate, taxpayers and property owners.8 Service of pro-
cess on parties joined as defendants is accomplished by publication of the
motion for judgment and the time and place fixed for hearing.87 The plain-
tiff must place all questions regarding the validity of bonds before the court
" Williams v. City of Raceland, 245 Ky. 212, -, 53 S.W.2d 370, 373 (1932).
, State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676,-, 157 So. 4, 5 (1934); Street v. Town of Ripley,
173 Miss. 225, _ 161 So. 855, 859 (1935).
"2 Street v. Town of Ripley, 173 Miss. 225, _ , 161 So. 855, 859 (1935); see text accom-
panying notes 30-32 supra.
' See Rohde v. City of Newport, 246 Ky. 476,, 55 S.W.2d 368, 370 (1932); Castevens
v. Stanly County, 211 N.C. 642, -, 191 S.E. 739, 745 (1937). But see Hatten v. Houston,
373 S.W.2d 525, 535 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963).
Validation statutes are often challenged on the ground that they confer a nonjudicial
function on courts. See Castevens v. Stanly County, 211 N.C. at_.., 191 S.E. at 745. Courts
uphold these statutes reasoning that it is the distinctive nature of judicial power to determine
rights and obligations that exist at the time of exercise of power, such as the power to issue
bonds. See Rohde v. City of Newport, 246 Ky. at -, 55 S.W.2d at 370. In fact, there is
little to distinguish a validation proceeding from an action for declaratory judgment. See
McNichols v. Denver, 101 Colo. 316, _ 74 P.2d 99, 103 (1937).
11 See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Mayor of Fayetteville, 173 Tenn. 111, __, 114
S.W.2d 811, 814 (1938) (statute providing that no proceeding questioning the validity of
bonds shall be brought after 20 days from date of publication of bond resolution held valid
under due process clause of state constitution).
See, e.g., Darby v. City of Vidalia, 75 Ga. App. 804, , 44 S.E.2d 454, 456, cert.
denied, 43 S.E.2d 152 (1947); State v. City of Daytona Beach, 160 Fla. 204, -, 34 So. 2d
309, 310 (1948); VA. CODE §§ 15.1-214 & 15.1-216 (1973). Statutes set forth proper or necessary
parties to validation proceedings. For example, VA. CODE § 15.1-214 (1973) provides that the
governing body of a political subdivision proposing to issue bonds may bring an action for
validation of such bonds. VA. CODE § 15.1-216 (Supp. 1979) provides that any person, corpora-
tion or association may contest the issuance of bonds by filing a motion for judgment within
45 days of a resolution authorizing issuance. A court decree validating bonds, absent timely
appeal, is forever binding as to the validity of the bonds and constitutes a permanent injunc-
tion against any person's contesting the validity of the bonds. VA. CODE § 15.1-220 (1973).
See 15 McQuiuN, supra note 4, § 43.145.
" See, e.g., State v. City of Daytona Beach, 160 Fla. 204, ., 34 So. 2d 309, 310 (1948).
See 15 McQun.uN, supra note 4, § 43.145.
" See, e.g., VA. CODE § 15.1-214 (1973). See 15 McQumLIN, supra note 4, § 43.146. Notice
by publication is sufficient to satisfy requirements of due process. State v. City of Venice,
147 Fla. 70, _ , 2 So. 2d 365, 365-67 (1941); State v. Special Road and Bridge Dist. No. 4,
127 Fla. 631, _ , 173 So. 716, 718 (1937). If notice is improperly given, however, an equity
court may review the appropriateness of a decree validating bonds and enjoin the issue. See
May Land Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 125 Fla. 146, , 169 So. 642, 642 (1936).
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since a judgment rendered without adequate pleading and proof is ineffec-
tive." The judgment rendered is conclusive with respect to matters deter-
mined against such defendants. 9 Thus, counsel may prompt a judicial
determination of the existence of conflicting interests and their effect on
the validity of bonds prior to issuance. A validation proceeding will pre-
clude later challenge to the validity of such bonds by parties to the action.
Purchasers may find further protection in statutes of limitations which
bar challenge to the validity of municipal bonds after a certain time." The
allowable period for challenge of an issue's validity under such statutes is
relatively short, running ten to thirty days from the date of authorization
of the issue.8 Where practical, parties involved in the issuance of munici-
pal bonds should allow the limitations period to run prior to issuance in
order to preclude later challenge to the bonds' validity.
The existence of conflicting interests in transactions underlying the
issuance of municipal bonds may invalidate the issue. Bond counsel should
carefully investigate facts and circumstances surrounding the issuance of
municipal bonds to determine the existence of conflicts of interests. The
difficulty of discovering such conflicts, however, creates the risk that coun-
sel will not uncover existing prohibited interests. If a municipal bond issue
is later challenged on the basis of conflict of interests, courts should be
reluctant to declare the bonds invalid, especially where bond counsel have
attempted to discover conflicts prior to issuance. In light of competing
policy considerations, courts should not allow common law and statutory
See Harrell v. Town of Whigham, 141 Ga. 322, - , 80 S.E. 1010, 1011-12 (1914). If
allegations made in a petition for validation are contested by defendants, the burden is on
the state or other plaintiff seeking validation of bonds to prove material facts required to
obtain validation. Id. at -, 80 S.E. at 1011-12. Where there is a total absence of such proof
it is error for a court to render judgment validating contested securities. Id. Merely alleging
facts required to obtain validation, however, will not suffice if parties do not contest the
proceeding. The responsibility is then on the court to see that a bond issue complies with
requirements of law. Id.
11 See North Miami v. Meredith, 121 F.2d 279, 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 674
(1941); cf. Jenkins v. Mayor of Savannah, 165 Ga. 121, -, 139 S.E. 863, 863 (1927) (judg-
ment in validation proceedings conclusive against citizens and taxpayers who could have
made themselves parties to action); Ballard County v. Kentucky County Debt Commission,
290 Ky. 770, __, 162 S.W.2d 771, 773 (1942) (judgment conclusive on all questions concern-
ing validity of bonds which might have been raised).
" See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 11-15-30 (1976) (20-day limitation period); VA. CODE § 15.1-212
(1973). VA. CODE § 15.1-212 (1973) provides that within 30 days of filing with the court a
certified copy of a resolution of the municipality authorizing the issuance of bonds, any person
in interest may contest the validity of such bonds. If no such challenge is made within the
30-day period, the authority to issue and all proceedings in connection with the authorization
and the issuance of the bonds are conclusively presumed to have been legally taken and no
court has the power to inquire into such matters. Id.
" See Morgan v. Feagin, 230 S.C. 315, - , 95 S.E.2d 621, 622 (1956). In Morgan, the
court upheld a 30-day statute of limitations period as reasonable. Id. The court concluded
that purchasers would be unwilling to invest in bonds which might be attacked for illegality
upon their issuance. Id. Furthermore, a long statutory limitations period might hinder sales
of bonds which are frequently timed to take advantage of favorable markets. Id.
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prohibitions of public officials' conflicting interests to cause disruption in
already unsettled municipal bond markets and burden innocent purchas-
ers with government misconduct.
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